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 Are metaphorical words and phrases merely clever use (or abuse) of language, or do they 
tell us something important about human thought and communication?  Conceptual Metaphor 
Theory (CMT), initially proposed by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson in 1980, claims that 
commonplace metaphorical expressions like “rising prices” and “a warm relationship” reflect 
deep conceptual relationships (e.g. MORE IS UP and AFFECTION IS TEMPERATURE) that 
shape almost all of human cognition.  CMT is supported by the “embodiment hypothesis,” the 
proposal that ordinary language use and comprehension involves areas of the brain primarily 
concerned with perception and muscle control (e.g. Barsalou, 1998).  These ideas challenge core 
assumptions of traditional theories about both language and mind, and they have drawn intense 
criticism.   
 Based on evidence from his own and others’ research, Raymond Gibbs, Jr. has been a 
major contributor to developing the embodiment hypothesis and a leading defender of CMT.  
The “metaphor wars” in the title (ARGUMENT IS WAR) expresses both the often heated nature 
of the theoretical disputes and Gibbs’s frustration with the failure of many critics to address the 
extensive empirical evidence in support of the embodiment hypothesis and CMT.  The WAR 
metaphor implies symbolic violence and “zero-sum” outcomes of victory or defeat.  Yet, 
throughout the book, Gibbs emphasizes the value of ideas from both sides of the debate and 
insists that no one theory will explain everything.  The tone and apparent intention of the book 
seem better captured by an alternative metaphor such as ARGUMENT IS BUSINESS AND 
NEGOTIATION (Gerard Steen, quoted in Rasulić, 2017), or perhaps ARGUMENT IS 
CONSTRUCTION or ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY.   
Background:  Setting the stage  
 This book seems to mark a kind of “milepost” or perhaps even a “turning point” in the 
development of Gibbs’s own theoretical views (ARGUMENT IS A JOURNEY).  He draws on 
his own extensive experimental research as well as his encyclopedic knowledge of others’ 
research, first to explain the major criticisms of CMT, then to refute many of these criticisms, 
and finally to qualify and moderate claims of CMT that have not been fully supported by 
empirical research, thereby building a foundation for a synthesis that would combine the stronger 
elements of several theories, including CMT.    
 Gibbs opens with a brief summary of the difference between the Cognitive Linguistics 
and traditional approaches that treat language, including metaphor, as distinct from both mind 
and experience.  This is followed by a summary of the most important criticisms of CMT from a 
variety of perspectives including traditional linguistics theories.  These sections provide the 
background for a detailed summary, analysis, and critique of the major criticisms of CMT and 
the embodiment hypotheses, which makes up the largest part of the book.   Gibbs gives a brief, 
clear explanation of CMT and the embodiment hypothesis, but generally assumes a relatively 
sophisticated knowledge of both language theory and of current metaphor theories.  The book 
will primarily appeal to scholars, researchers, and advanced students who are already well-versed 
in CMT, competing theories of language and metaphor, and the on-going disputes between 
advocates for these alternative approaches. 
The heart of the book:  Review, critique, and synthesis.  
 Gibbs represents the theoretical issues at stake in this argument and the evidence 
supporting each position clearly and succinctly, and lays the foundation for future synthesis.  The 
book is impressive for Gibbs’s encyclopedic mastery of an enormous volume of research, and for 
his balanced and thoughtful treatment of research that contradicts his own views.  He refutes 
some claims of other researchers but more frequently shows how the claims of research from 
different perspectives might be integrated into a broader, more complex account of metaphor use 
and comprehension.  The overall tone of the book is transitional, marked by debates not only 
with other researchers and scholars, but also within Gibbs’s own conceptualization of the topic.  
That is a decided strength of the book:  It’s like looking over the shoulder of one of the top 
researchers in cognitive linguistics as he wrestles with a mass of contradiction-ridden research 
findings and balances the apparent contradictions – never understating the complexity of the 
issues.     
 Although his review of contradictory research is generally thorough and balanced, there 
are a few places in which Gibbs overlooks potentially important research.  In the introductory 
chapter, Gibbs contextualizes the discussion within a rejection of the traditional computational 
model of mind and language, specifically citing and disagreeing with Pinker.  Here he might 
usefully have cited Barsalou (1998 and subsequent), who demonstrates that all higher-order 
cognitive processes can in principle be accomplished through fully embodied “perceptual 
simulations.”   
 In his review of alternative approaches to metaphor comprehension Gibbs briefly 
mentions Kintsch’s demonstration that an approach based on natural language statistics (co-
occurrence of words and phrases) can account for at least simple idiomatic metaphors.  Here it 
might have been useful to acknowledge the evidence from some of Kintsch’s colleagues (e.g. 
Landauer & Dumais, 1997) that much of our vocabulary (presumably including idiomatic 
metaphors Gibbs discusses, like “kick the bucket” and “spill the beans”) is learned initially 
through connections with other language as it is encountered in spoken and written contexts, and 
not through direct correlation with embodied experience.  Landauer and Dumais’s work might 
also contribute to an eventual “grand synthesis” theory of metaphor.   
 In his otherwise astute discussion of framing research, including Thibodeau and 
Boroditsky’s “crime is a beast / virus” experiments, Gibbs fails to address the recent research by 
Steen, Reijnierse, and Burgers (2013), who replicated Thibodeau and Boroditsky and found no 
evidence of framing effects, implying that metaphorical framing may be weaker than previously 
claimed.  In his discussion of neurological research using fMRI, Gibbs also fails to address the 
trenchant criticisms by Casasanto and Gijssels (2015), who demonstrate flaws in the fMRI 
research that has generally supported CMT and contrast it with fMRI other research that has 
found no evidence of embodiment effects.   
 In his discussion of Steen’s Deliberate Metaphor Theory, Gibbs rightly criticizes Steen’s 
failure to consider experimental evidence showing that people respond at least weakly to the 
metaphors implied by idioms like “chew on an idea” or “warm relationship.”  However, he rather 
too easily dismisses Steen’s claim that metaphors are sometimes used deliberately (i.e. as a result 
of conscious deliberation and selection).  Indeed, Gibbs’s argument against deliberate metaphor 
use is implicitly contradicted by some of his own claims.  For example, on p. 173, he observes 
that “asking people to explain their thoughts when using verbal metaphors provides one kind of 
empirical evidence on the existence of conceptual metaphors…”  If people are able to respond in 
this way they must also be able to deliberate about and report their deliberations about metaphor 
use, consistent with Steen.  The point that Steen ignores experimental evidence of embodied 
response to commonplace metaphor vehicles is well-taken, and Steen might further be criticized 
for conflating characteristics of the message, which can be observed and measured, with thought 
processes of the message originator and perceivers’ attributions about the originator, neither of 
which can be directly observed.  However, the fact that neither researcher nor research 
participant can have direct knowledge of an originator’s thought processes doesn’t support the 
stronger claim that metaphors are never or even rarely used deliberately, or that attributions of 
intentionality might influence a perceiver’s processing effort.  As noted above, these are minor 
issues in a generally thorough and insightful review of metaphor research.   
Summary:  The state of play   
 CMT was proposed as an elegantly simple theory based on the idea that human thought is 
fundamentally metaphorical, that concepts are based on metaphorical mappings in which abstract 
concepts like LOVE and LIFE are experienced as embodied concepts like WARMTH and MOTION 
THROUGH SPACE.  As initially proposed, these conceptual metaphors are fixed and more or less 
universal.  Subsequent research has muddied this initial clarity in several ways.  Most 
importantly, research has consistently shown that the “source domains” of conceptual metaphors 
are at least weakly activated whenever metaphorical language is processed, supporting one of the 
fundamental claims of CMT.  On the other hand, based on the accumulating evidence: (1) 
research has failed to substantiate in any conclusive way that these weak activations have a 
consistent effect on outcomes such as beliefs and opinions, (2) people do not necessarily 
interpret metaphors the same way and do not associate the same CMs with metaphors, and (3) 
many other aspects of a communicative situation independently affect metaphor use and 
interpretation.  CMT emerges from Gibbs’s review as an elegant and powerful theory about the 
interconnectedness of mind, language, and embodied experience that has been only partially 
supported by subsequent, often contradictory, research.  As Gibbs highlights throughout the 
book, many aspects of the theory remain undecided pending further research.  However, 
supporters as well as critics of CMT will need to give thoughtful consideration to Gibbs’s 
analysis and critique of evidence on both sides of the issue.   
Overall assessment  
 This book, by one of the top researchers in cognitive linguistics, is an important 
contribution to the debate about how people use and understand metaphor.  Its flaws are few and 
minor; its strengths many.  The book provides a comprehensive review and critique of the 
current state of research and theory about metaphor, and a solid foundation for developing a 
“grand synthesis” theory of metaphor use and comprehension.  Scholars and researchers with 
even a secondary interest in metaphor theory, language theory, or general theories of cognition 
will find this book important and engaging.  Scholars and researchers engaged directly in 
metaphor research will find it essential reading.   
  
 
 
References 
 
Barsalou, L.  (1999).  Perceptual symbol systems.  Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 22, 577-609.   
Bergen, B. K. (2012).  Louder than words:  The new science of how the mind makes meaning.  
NYC:  Basic Books.    
Casasanto, D., and Gijssels, T. (2015).  What makes a metaphor an embodied metaphor?  
Quellenangabe: Linguistics Vanguard. ISSN (Online) 2199-174X, DOI: 10.1515/lingvan-
2014-1015, January 2015. 
Landauer, T. K., and Dumais, S. T. (1997).  A solution to Plato’s problem:  The latent semantic 
analysis theory of acquisition induction, and representation of knowledge.  Psychological 
Review, 104, 211-240. 
Rasulić, K. (2017). A metaphor biangle: Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr. and Gerard J. Steen.  Metaphor 
and the Social World 7, 130–151.   
Steen, G. S., Reijnierse, W. G., and Burgers, C. (2013).  When Do Natural Language Metaphors 
Influence Reasoning? A Follow-Up Study to Thibodeau and Boroditsky.  PLOS One.  
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0113536. 
 
 
 
Bio note  
L. David Ritchie is a Professor of Communication at Portland State University in Portland, 
Oregon (USA).  His primary research focus is metaphor use, story-telling, and humor in 
naturally-occurring discourse including conversation, political speeches, and environmental 
communication.  He is the author of two books on metaphor, Context and Connection in 
Metaphor, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2006) and Metaphor (CUP, 2013), and has another book 
forthcoming, Metaphorical Stories in Discourse (CUP). 
